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Abstract 
 
This article provides partial mathematical analysis of Amartya Sen’s published paper “Peas-
ants and Dualism With or Without Surplus Labor”. This paper may provide useful illustra-
tions of the applications of mathematics to economics. Here three portions of Sen’s paper ‘the 
simplest model, production for a market response and to withdrawal of labor’ are discussed in 
some details. Results of the study are given in mathematical formulations with physical inter-
pretations. An attempt is taken here to make the Sen’s paper more interesting to the readers 
who have desire for detailed mathematical explanations with theoretical analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Amartya Kumar Sen is the most important and prolific living philosopher-economist. At present he is 
Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard 
University. He was born in Santinikatan, India and studied at Calcutta and at Cambridge. He has 
influential contributions to economic science in the fields of social choice theory, welfare economics, 
feminist economics, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, identity theory and the theory of jus-
tice. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998 [1]. 
    In this study we have discussed peasant economies on the basis of Sen’s published paper 
“Peasants and Dualism With or Without Surplus Labor” [2]. In 1966 most of the peasants were very 
poor and some of them were landless. They used old technologies and traditional seeds for cultivation. 
Some laborers worked on the field only for a poor meal. They worked some cases in agriculture with 
little or no wages. On the other hand in 2016 most of the peasants are solvent and use modern tech-
nologies. They are using new variety of seeds, insecticides and manure and finding proper irrigation 
facilities. As a result they find maximum harvest.  
     In this article we explore elementary mathematical techniques in some details with displaying 
diagram where necessary. We have chosen this article of Sen for mathematical review because we 
have observed that we can do some work on it which will be beneficial for the modern peasants. We 
stress application of mathematics in the Sen’s paper so that readers can realize it easily. Although 
Sen’s paper was published in 1966, we thought its usefulness would remain same to some (but very 
few) peasants even 50 years later in 2016. We consider here some explicit functions with the stated 
properties, such as the derivative being positive by Sen. In this review paper we set two examples to 
examine various aspects, such as points of equilibrium clearly and in some details. 
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    The objective of the study is to represent mathematical analysis of Sen’s paper mentioned above. 
Although the paper is published in 1966, we thought its importance would remain present to few 
farmers even in 2016. We hope detailed mathematical analysis will be helpful to the readers those 
who want to work on peasant family. Main objective of this review paper is to help the peasants of 
Bangladesh those who are in backward and may be benefited from this study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Amartya Kumar Sen has given peasants economies in his published paper in 1966, where he dis-
cusses the economic equilibrium of a peasant family, the effect of surplus labor and withdrawal of 
labor, dual equilibrium between peasant and capitalist, and efficiency of resource allocation in 
peasant agriculture [2]. Sen [3] has discussed that food security is based in turn on access to re-
sources, production technologies, environmental and market conditions, non-market food transfers 
and accumulated food reserves. Dale W. Jorgenson has enlightened the surplus agricultural labor 
and the development of a dual economy focusing on the relationship between the degrees of indus-
trialization and the level of economic development [4]. A survey was conducted by Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati and Sukhamoy Chakravarty on, i) planning theory and techniques, ii) agriculture, and iii) 
foreign trade of Indian economy [5]. Mark R. Rosenzweig has shown that to capture the essential 
features of rural agriculture and to maintain tractability, a labor market composed of two types of 
labor, male and female, and three agricultural households; a landless household and two households 
with different size plots, small and large, of quality standardized land producing a homogeneous 
agricultural commodity [6]. Abhijit V. Banerjee and Andrew F. Newman has examined the interac-
tions among different institutional arrangements in a general equilibrium model of a modernizing 
economy [7]. Scale efficiency of Indian farmers is studied by Atanu Sengupta and Subrata Kundu 
[8]. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan has discussed food, agriculture, nutrition and economic development 
of Bangladesh [9,10].  
    Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith have revealed that the agricultural progress and rural 
development in developing nations and expressed the progressive improvement in rural levels 
through increases in small-farm incomes, output and productivity, along with genuine food security 
[11]. Paul Spicker, Sonia Alvarez Leguizamón and David Gordon analyzed the female-male wage 
ratio, and female labor-force participation rate in agriculture. They also discussed about lowland 
small and medium farm owners and cultivators [12]. Zipporah G. Glass worked on Amartya Sen’s 
model of entitlement and food security which focuses from supply and demand economics towards 
a household unit of analysis and effect [13]. Mausumi Mahapatro examined the nexus between land, 
migration and rural differentiation within the context of two villages in rural Bangladesh [14]. M. N. 
Baiphethi and P. T. Jacobs highlighted that poor households of South Africa access their food from 
the market, subsistence production and transfers from public programmes [15]. Sophia Murphy has 
exposed that agriculture had historically not been a global matter, though food has been traded 
across borders for thousands of years [16]. 
 
3. Methodology of the Study 
 
In this study we have used the secondary data and analyze on previous published papers. This is a 
review paper and discusses the mathematical analysis of Sen’s paper “Peasants and Dualism With or 
Without Surplus Labor”. In this work we introduce two examples and try to give mathematical 
framework which (we think) Sen has not provided in detail. We have used techniques of the opti-
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mization of differential calculus. We also discussed the geometrical interpretation of mathematical 
results. In addition we have displayed diagrams where appropriate.  
 
4. Highlights on the Simplest Model 
 
Here we have discussed basic assumptions of Sen’s economic equilibrium of peasant model. Suppose 
a community of identical peasant families each with   working members and   total members 
   . Each of the families has some stock of land and capital. The output of the family Q  is only 
function of labor L , i.e.,  LQQ  , which is twice differentiable always and diminishing with 
marginal productivity of labor. Hence the derivative of  LQ  yields; 
 
 LQ
dL
LdQ
                   (1) 
is the marginal productivity of labor. From our common sense,  
  0 LQ  and   0 LQ .              (2) 
For the maximization output Q , for LL 0  and  LQ  vanishes (figure 1), i.e., 
  0 LQ .                   (3) 
                       LQ  
 
 
           Q  
 
 
  
                      O           L   
 
Figure 1: The function  LQ  represents the curve of maximization output Q . 
 
On the other hand  LQ  approaches zero asymptotically, while  LQ  approaches Q  (figure 2), 
i.e.,  
   0lim 

LQ
L
,   QQ ˆ .                  (4) 
 
    LQ  
                           Qˆ     
 
       
 
 
 
                    O             L  
Figure 2: The function  LQ  represents the asymptotic curve of output Qˆ . 
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The total income (output) of the family, Q , is shared equally among all the members of the family, 
but the total labor L , is shared equally among all the working members. Let q  is the individual 
income of any member and l  is the amount of labor of any working member as,  
qQ                  and         lL  .            (5) 
Again, every member of the family has a personal utility function  qU  (i.e.,  qU  is the same for 
all members), which is a function of individual income q  and every working member has a personal 
disutility function  lV  (i.e.,  lV  is the same for all working members), which is a function of 
individual labor l . The ‘disutility’ is roughly speaking, the ‘difficulty’ or ‘inconvenience’ of putting 
in labor of amount l . The function U  and V  satisfy the following properties: 
 qUU  ,   0 qU ,   0 qU                (6) 
 lVV  ,   0 lV ,   0 lV .               
 (7) 
From (6) we see that the marginal utility from income is positive and non-increasing. From (7) we 
observe that the marginal disutility from labor is non-negative and non-decreasing [2].  
    Each person’s notion of family welfare W  in a suitable sense is given by the net utility from 
income and effort of all members taken together attaching the same weight to everyone’s happiness. 
Let a subscript i  represents the ith individual, then the family welfare W  is given by; 




11 i
i
i
i VUW .                  (8) 
If it is assumed that all the functions iU  and iV  are the same, then we have, 
     lqWlVqUW ,  .                (9) 
Each individual could equally well regard W  as a function of Q  and L , since, 

Q
q  , 

L
l   (by 
(5)). Further, since, Q  is a function of L , we can conclude that W  is also a function of L ; 
   lVqUW   
















L
V
Q
U
 

















L
V
LQ
U  LWˆ , (say).   (10) 
Assume welfare is maximized by 0LL  , then we can write; 
  0ˆ
ˆ
 LW
dL
Wd
                  (11) 
provided that   0ˆ  LW . Now we can write, 
L
l
l
W
L
q
q
W
dL
Wd









 ..
ˆ
     lVlQqU  ,           (12) 
since  qU
q
W



 , 
 

LQ
L
q 



,  lV
l
W



  and 

1



L
l
.      (13) 
From (11) and (12) we get; 
 
 
 
x
qU
lV
LQ 


  (say).                (14) 
Sen defined x  as the ‘real cost of labor’ which indicates that labor is applied up to the point where its 
marginal product equals the real cost of labor. 
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5. Illustrative Examples 
 
In the light of above discussion we consider two explicit examples as follows: 
 
5.1 Example A  
We make an ad hoc assumptions about the form of the functions  LQ ,  lV ,  qU  and show that 
for suitable values of the parameters occurring in these functions, they satisfy the conditions stated 
above. We then proceed to calculate the maximization point 0LL   
etc. 
     We assume  LQ ,  qU  and  lV  to be given by the following expressions: 
   aLeQLQ  10                      (15a) 
   bqUqU  1ln0                     (15b) 
   10  kleVlV                 (15c) 
where 0Q , 0U , 0V , a , k and b  are positive constants. Note that,   00 Q ,   00 V  and 
  00 U . First and second order partial derivatives of (15a,b,c) give; 
  00 
aLaeQLQ ,   020 
aLeaQLQ
 
             (16a) 
  0
1
0 


bq
bU
qU ,  
 
0
1
2
2
0 



bq
bU
qU                (16b) 
  00 
klkeVlV ,   020 
klekVlV .                (16c) 
Also the conditions (2), (6) and (7) are all satisfied if all the constants are positive. Again, (15a) and 
(16a) give; 
    0limlim 0  

aL
LL
aeQLQ ,   0QQ  .              (17) 
From (10) we get (15a,b,c) for the welfare function W  as; 
   lVqUW    
   11ln 00  kleVbqU   
    111ln /000 





  

 kLaL eVeQ
b
U
 
 LWˆ .                    (18) 
 
Now we get, 
 
0
1
ˆ
/
0
0
00 






 kL
aL
aL
keV
ebQ
eUQab
dL
Wd
             (19) 
 
which is the same as the explicit form as (11). Now from (19) we get; 
0/00
/
00
/
000 
  kLaLkLkLaL keQbVkeQbVkeVeUQab  
  00000
/
00 
 bQkVkeQbVeUQab aLkLaL   .          (20) 
Now we define a new variable X  in terms of L  and choose the constants a  and k  as; 
aLeX  , ak  .                 (21) 
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Using (21), equation (20) becomes the quadratic equation for X  as; 
    00000
2
00  bQkVXQbkVXUQab  .           (22) 
Solution of (22) becomes; 
    
00
2
1
0000
2
0000
2
4
UQab
bQVUQabkQbkVQbkV
X

 
 ,     

























2
1
00
0
0
0 1
4
11
2 bQkV
Ua
Ua
kV 

.            (23) 
For the relevant solution we should consider only positive sign of (23), then we get, 

























2
1
00
0
0
0 1
4
11
2 bQkV
Ua
Ua
kV
X


.            (24) 
 

























2
1
0
111
2
bQ
A
A
X

 
where 
0
04
V
U
A


 .                  (25) 
For real solution we get from (21); 
10  X  and the constants  , b , 0U  and 0Q  must satisfy the following inequality; 
000 VUbQ                       (25a) 
Inequality (25a) is free of  , it has a wider meaning than simply facilitating the derivation of an 
exact and explicit solution which is not clear at this stage. The solution can be studied in detail by 
taking specific, reasonable sets of numerical values of the constants occurring in the solution. 
 
5.2 Example B  
 
Here we made ad hoc assumptions about the form of the function, and show that these satisfy the 
relevant conditions, and then proceed via the corresponding welfare function, to obtain the value of 
L  which maximizes this function at LL   and LL 0 . We consider the functions  LQ ,  lV , 
 qU  be as follows: 
   LLLaLQ  2                     (26a) 
   bqUqU  1ln0                     (26b) 
     LLLVlllVlV  // 00 ,                (26c) 
since /Ll   and /Ll  . Throughout this example we confine ourselves to the interval 
ll 0  or LL 0 . Here (26b) is same as (15b) of example A. From (26c) we get; 
    0/ 20  lllVlV ,     0/2
3
0  lllVlV .          (27) 
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We observe that if l  tends to l , the three functions  lV ,  lV   and  lV   tend to infinity. 
Hence it is reasonable that it is difficult for an individual to reach the amount of labor given by ll  . 
For this reason we confine the values of l  are confined to the interval ll 0  and also those of L  
are to the interval LL 0  and lL  .  
   From (26a) we get; 
    02  LLaLQ ,   02  aLQ             (28) 
for LL 0  and   0 LQ  at LL   as we expect. Maximum of Q  is given by  LQQ  ; re-
late L  with a  as follows: 
  2LaLQQ  .                  (29) 
    Now we can express the function  lV  in figure 3. Here we have measured the output Q  in 
terms of money but it is not the case, because Q  can be measured in some other units, such as, in kg, 
liter etc. (e.g., if the peasants themselves consume their own products and calculate in such units). If 
Q  is measured in money, then q  must be in money also. If  qU  is measured in some units, then 
0U  must be measured in the same unit, so that  bq1ln  must be dimensionless, that is, a pure 
number. Obviously bq  must be a pure number, which indicates that b  must have dimension of 
inverse money. Similarly, if labor L  is measured in hours, then the constant ‘ a ’ has the dimension 
of money/ hour2, etc. To avoid the different form of dimension we avoid dimension in our calcula-
tions. The welfare function W  is given by;  
   lVqUW    
   LW
LL
L
VLLL
ba
U ˆ21ln 00 







 

 .          (30) 
 
 lV  
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
                     O           l       l   
 
Figure 3: The function  lV  is asymptote at ll  . 
 
From (30) derivative of  LWˆ  with respect to L  gives; 
 
   
20
0
21
2ˆ
LL
L
V
LLL
ab
LLabU
dL
Wd










 

.            (31) 
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For maximum welfare (i.e., 0
ˆ

dL
Wd
) we get from (31); 
    0212 0
3
0 





 LLL
ab
LVLLabU


 
  0
22
3
2
3 22
0
02
0
02
0
03 























 LLLLL
abU
V
LL
U
V
LL
U
V
L





.     (32) 
   We know that a cubic equation can be solved in radicals in terms of the coefficients. We observe 
that solution of (32) will be complicated, so that we cannot find exact and necessary information from 
it. In this situation we proceed in an indirect way. First, we introduce some preliminary remarks.  
   The property of a cubic equation that it has three roots, all real, or one real and two complex. In this 
example we are confined to find a root in the interval LL 0  that must satisfy that second order 
derivative of welfare function will be negative, since it must maximize W . 
    From (30) we see that welfare function  LWˆ  vanishes at 0L  and   00ˆ W . It is reasonable 
in the present situation, since if there is no labor, there is no welfare (income). As L  increases from 
zero, one expects welfare to rise from value zero. We can proceed if the first derivative of (31) is 
positive at 0L ; 
02
ˆ
0
0
0









L
V
LabU
dL
Wd
L

.              (33) 
i.e.,   02 020  VLabU   
002 VQbU  ,  (by (29), QLa 
2
).             (34) 
  Here the constant 0U  is a sort of measure of the utility to the individual and hence to the family, 
while 0V  is a measure of disutility of labor to the working members. For any fixed 0U , the ine-
quality (34) will not be valid if 0V  become too large, in such a situation welfare will not rise from the 
value zero. This happen if the potential working members have some chronic illness, so that labor 
becomes prohibitively difficult for large 0V . Finally, we conclude that inequality (33) is satisfied 
when L  increases from zero, and the welfare function also increase from zero.  
     Now the second derivative of Wˆ  gives; 
 
 
   
3
0
2
22
0
22
0
2
2 2
21
4
21
2ˆ
LL
LaV
LLL
ab
LLUba
LLL
ab
abU
dL
Wd















.       (35) 
   We observe that this function is negative for all values of L  in our expected interval LL 0 . 
Thus, as  LWˆ  increases from zero at 0L , its rate of increase diminishes and there will be a point 
in LL 0  at which  LWˆ  reaches its maximum value. We assume that the  LWˆ  is maximum 
at LL
2
1
 . We will also examine if reasonable parameter values can be found that will achieve this 
circumstance. Now we write (32) using (25) and (29) as follows: 
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   0
214
3
2
3 223 

















 L
bk
Q
a
LL
k
LL
k
L

.         (36) 
 
Since LL
2
1
  is a root of equation (36), putting LL
2
1
  we get; 
0
212
3
2
12
3
4
1
8
1 3333 

















 L
bk
Q
Q
L
k
L
k
L

 
0
21
1
2
3
2
12
3
4
1
8
1













QbkQkk

 
8
12
2
3

Qbkk

.                  (37) 
     From (34) we get; 
00 2 UQbV   
1
4
.
2
0
0 
U
V
Qb 

 
1
2

kQb

, by (23).                 (38) 
Since 0k , so that 1
2
3

k
. Hence from (37) we get the strict inequality,  
8
12

kQb

.                   (39) 
But we need a more consistent value and we choose (39) for our convenience way as follows: 
32
12

kQb

.                   (40) 
Using (37) to (40) we can write (36) in a more convenience way as solvable form as follows: 
0
32
31
8
26
8
25 3223  LLLLLL .              (41) 
Since LL
2
1
  is a solution of (41) we get; 
0
2
1
16
31
2
1
8
21
2
1 22 

















 LLLLLLLLLL  
LL
2
1
 ,
    
0
16
31
8
21 22  LLLL .             (42) 
Solution of 2nd equation of (42) is;  
 LiL 5521
16
1
 .                    (42a) 
Hence, LL
2
1

 
is the only real root at which the welfare function  LWˆ  is maximum. We can 
write welfare function (30) as follows: 
  10  
 
     LWLWLW 21ˆ     
where,      





 LLL
ab
ULW 21ln01

 ;  
LL
LV
LW

 02

.        (43) 
Since   00ˆ W , so that     000 21 WW , which implies that there is no welfare if there is no labor. 
Derivative of (43) gives, 
 
 LLLab
LLabU
dL
dW



21
2 01
  
 and 
 2
02
LL
LaV
dL
dW

 .           (44) 
For 0L  (44) becomes; 
LabU
dL
dW
L
0
0
1 2






,   
L
V
dL
dW
L
0
0
2 






.           (45) 
From (44) and (45) we have two properties as; 
0
2
0
1













LL dL
dW
dL
dW
 ;   
0
2
0
1













LL dL
dW
dL
dW
.          (46) 
i.e., 
L
V
LabU 002

  ;  
L
V
LabU 002

 .            (47) 
    
               LW1 ,  LW2  
 
                                                LW1  
 
                                                      LW2  
    1                                   
                    O     2             L      
 
Figure 4: The behavior of the functions  LW1  and  LW2  for 21   . 
 
We represent (47) in figure (4), which indicates 21    and figure (5), which indicates 21    
respectively. The broken lines are tangents to the curves  LW1  and  LW2  at 0L , if they make 
angles 1  and 2  respectively with the positive L -axis, then clearly,  
LabU 01 2tan  ; 
L
V0
2tan

  .               (48) 
 
Again 
 302
2
2
2
LL
L
V
dL
Wd

   is positive throughout the interval LL 0  and tends to infinity as 
L  is approached from below. Since  LW2  occurs with a negative sign in the expression for  LWˆ  
in (43), it is this property of 
2
2
2
dL
Wd
 that makes 
2
2 ˆ
dL
Wd
 negative throughout the interval 
H. K Mohajan 
 
 11  
 
 
 LW1 ,  LW2  
 
                                           LW2  
 
 
         
2               LW1              
                                
1  
                                O                           L      
 
Figure 5: The behavior of the functions  LW1  and  LW2  for 21   . 
 
LL 0 , as noted earlier. Again vanishes at LL   at which 0
2
1
2

dL
Wd
 (by first two terms of (35)), 
so that LL   is a maximum of  LW1  (figure 6). The above analysis has some intrinsic, wider 
interest, since the welfare function generally consists of a positive term representing the utility of the 
whole family, and a negative term incorporating the disutility of the working members. Another 
reason for carrying out the above analysis in some detail is to display a mildly pathological situation 
which nevertheless can be given a reasonable interpretation.  
    Let us fix the values of 0,,,, Uba   and choose two values of 0V  denoted by 
   2
0
1
0 ,VV , such 
that; 
 
L
V
LabU
1
0
02

    ;   
 
L
V
LabU
2
0
02

             (49) 
and set  LW1  as defined by (43) as above. Now we define the corresponding welfare functions as 
follows: 
     
       LWLWLW 121
1ˆ  ;          LWLWLW 222
2ˆ  .       (50) 
For 
 1
0VV  , the welfare function 
  LW 1ˆ  begins to rise with L  from the value zero at 0L , and 
for 
 2
0VV  , the welfare function 
  LW 2ˆ  begins to diminish from the value zero as L  increase 
from 0L .  We have, 
   






 LLL
ab
ULW 21ln01

 .              (51) 
Let,    LLLabLh  21

, then,  
    LhULW ln01  .                (52) 
The welfare function 
  LW 1ˆ  has a positive maximum at 0LL  , but 
  LW 2ˆ  decreases from the 
value zero at 0L  to negative values and therefore has no maximum in LL 0 . 
 
The quadratic  Lh  vanishes at 1LL   and 2LL   is given by; 
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2
1
2
1 






ab
LLL

; 
2
1
2
1 






ab
LLL

           (53) 
with 01 L  and LL 22   (figure 6). Moreover   1Lh  at LL 2 ,0 , where vanishes,  Lh  is 
maximum at LL  , with   011 2 

bQ
L
ab
Lh , so that,   01 LW . Since  Lh  vanishes at 
21, LLL  ;   Lhln  and  LW1  tends to infinity at these values. 
 
 
 LW1  
                                                                 
     
  LW 1ˆ  
                     1L     O  0L            L              2 L    2L  
                     L   
  LW 2ˆ  
  LW 12  
   
  LW 22  
 
Figure 6: Nature of the functions  LW1 , 
  LW 1ˆ ,   LW 2ˆ ,   LW 12  and 
  LW 22  are dis-
played.  
 
 
Now consider the mild pathological situation. For this we consider (47) the inequation as equation, 
L
V
LabU 002

  
002 VQbU   
,
 
(by (29), 
2LaQ  ).
            
(54) 
Using (54) in (32) we get; 
0
2
33 22 



















 L
Qb
LL
Qb
LL

.            (55) 
The solutions of (55) are; 
0L , 





































2
1
2
2
3433
2
1

QbQbQb
L
 

































2
1
133
2
1

QbQbQb
L .          (56) 
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                                LWˆ  
 
          0L          L   
    0
ˆ W          L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Zero welfare (no welfare) is a genuine maximum at no labor ( 0L ), of the welfare func-
tion  LWˆ . 
 
As we have seen earlier that two roots of (56) are complex, let us now choose ,,Qb  as, 
30 

Qb
. Again since 0
ˆ
2
2

dL
Wd
 
at 0L  (from (35)), the point 0L  in this case is only 
maximum in the range LL 0  of the function  LWˆ . Hence no welfare is a genuine maximum at 
no labor (figure 7). 
 
6. Review on ‘Production for a Market’ 
 
A.K. Sen has considered the circumstance when the product Q  is not directly useable by the peas-
ants, so it is exchanged for goods directly enjoyable by the peasants. Also it may happen that part of 
the product Q  is used while the rest is exchanged for other goods. If the whole amount C  of the 
new product, the individual share being 

C
c  , we can define as a (section 5) a utility function of the 
same type that is, a function of c ; 
 cUU  ,   0 CU ,   0 CU .              (57) 
The price of output Q  in terms of C  is p  per unit; 
cQpC  .                  (58) 
So that the maximum of the family welfare is given by; 
 
 
 cUp
lV
LQ


 .                  (59) 
    Let us now consider a situation in which a part of the product Q  is sold and a part is consumed. 
Individually, C  amount of the purchased commodity and q  of the self product one is enjoyed per 
member. Let y  be the properties of output that is marketed. Sen defines a utility function with the 
following properties; 
  qcUU , ; 0qU , 0cU , 0qqU , 0ccU ; 
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   
   
1
,,
,,,









qcUqcU
qcUqcU
cc
qq
.               (60) 
Again we have; 
  qyQ 1 , cQypC                 (61) 
with allocation rules; 
cq pUU  ;  
 
qU
LV
LQ

 .               (62) 
 
We have also used the same form of the utility function for both of the examples, A and B. Now we 
consider the utility function,  
    pqcbUqcU  1ln, 0 .               (63) 
Taking derivatives of (63) with respect to q  we get; 
 
 pqcb
bpU
qcUq


1
, 0 ;     
 pqcb
bpU
qcUq




1
, 0 , if 1 .      (64) 
 Hence from (64) we have; 
   qcUqcU qq  ,,  .                (65) 
  We observe that (65) agrees with (60) and also agrees with examples A and B.  
 
7. Discussion on Response to Withdrawal of Labor 
  
Sen also discusses the problem of surplus labor and response of peasant output to withdrawal of labor. 
The surplus labor is defined as that part of the labor force in this peasant economy that can be re-
moved without reducing the total amount of output produced, even when the amount of other factors 
is not changed [2].  Now from (13) in slightly different form we get; 
      qULQLV                       (66a) 
    

/LQULQ
L
V 





                    (66b) 
where (66a) is an equation but not identity. Here maximization of welfare function occurs at 0LL  . 
We assume (66a) to be valid for all 

L
l  ,   /LQq  , etc. Taking derivatives of both sides of (66a) 
with respect to l  we get;  
     
 
   
 
dl
qUd
LQqU
dl
LQd
lV



  
        qULQqULQ  2


 .            (67) 
   Now if   0 LQ ,   0 qU ,   0 qU , then (67) gives   0 lV , which violates (7), unless 
      0 lVLVLQ , which is not necessarily the case. Hence (66a) is indeed an equation. Sen 
envisages a situation, in which the ratio of total number of members to working members is constant, 
denoted by K ; 
 K .                   (68) 
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So that when one working member leaves, he provides support for K  members (including himself) 
and so the peasant family is left with one less working member and K  less consuming ones.  
 
Taking derivatives of (14) with respect to   we get;  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 d
qUd
qU
lV
qUd
lVd
qU
lV
d
d
d
dx 












 .
1
.
1
.
2
.        (69) 
We have,  
   
 

















2
.




L
d
dL
lV
d
dl
dl
lVd
d
lVd
.            (70) 
   
 d
dQ
dQ
qUd
d
qUd
.



 
d
dQ
dQ
dq
qU ..  
 


d
dQ
dQ
Qd
qU .
/
.  
 


d
dQ
dQ
KQd
qU .
/
.  
  







Q
d
dQ
qU
1
.     2/. 

 





 KQ
d
dL
LQqU .         (71) 
Differentiating (14),  LQx  , with respect to   we get; 
 
 d
dL
LQ
d
dx
 .                  (72) 
Using (70) to (72) in (69) we get; 
 
 
   
  
    









































 2
22
/.
1
.
1







KQ
d
dL
LQqU
qU
lV
L
d
dL
lV
qUd
dL
LQ .  (73) 
Simplifying (73) we get;  
 
 
 
   
  
 











 qU
qU
LQlV
qU
lV
LQ
d
dL
2
11

 
 
   
  222
...
qU
qUlV
Q
K
qU
lVL







.    (74) 
Using (14),  
 
 lQ
lV
qU


  and multiplying by 
 lQ

 we get from (74); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 qU
qU
LQ
LQ
LQ
qV
lV
qU
qU
Q
lV
lV
KL
d
dL















..
.            (75) 
  This is Sen’s equation (31) but we have derived the equation more detailed than Sen has. Sen in-
troduces some elasticities as follows [2]: 
E  is the elasticity of output with respect to the number of working members, m  is the absolute 
value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to individual income, n  is the 
elasticity of marginal disutility from work with respect to individual hours of work, G  is the elas-
ticity of output with respect to hours of labor, g  is the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal 
product of labor with respect to hours of labor. These quantities are defined by the following rela-
tions: 
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

d
dQ
Q
E . ; 
 
 lV
lV
ln


 . ; 
 
 qU
qU
qm


 ; 
 
Q
LQ
LG

 . ; 
 
 LQ
LQ
Lg


 . .     (76) 
Also we have,  
 d
dL
LQ
d
dQ
 .              (77) 
Using (5), (76) and (77) in (75) we get the response equation; 
q
Q
mg
L
n
l
m
q
Q
l
L
Kn
Q
Q
E







..
.
1
.  









gGmn
nm
GE .                 (78) 
Now we consider the example A. From (15a) we get; 
 d
dL
aeQ
d
dQ aL 0 .                 (79) 
From (76), using (15a) we get; 


d
dL
e
ae
E
aL
aL




1
.                  (80) 
From (76) and (15a), (16a,b,c) we get; 
aL
aL
e
aLe
G




1
; lKn  ; 
qb
qb
m


1
; aLg  .           (81) 
Using (79) to (81) in (78) we get; 
aL
e
e
qb
qbaL
lK
qb
qb
lK
l
d
dL
aL
aL








1
.
1
1

.              (82) 
If GE   we get from (76); 
l
L
d
dL


.                  (83) 
Using (83) and (21), (82) becomes; 
aL
X
X
qb
qb



 1
21
.
1
.                 (84) 
In this case L  be very large to satisfy (84) and marginal disutility schedule approach to the vertical 
position, which of course will tend to toward constancy of the change in labor hours proportional to 
the change in the number of working people [2].  
 
Now we consider a special case for 0n  and GE   in (78) we get; 
G
g
m


1
.                   (85) 
Using (76) and (21), (85) becomes; 
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 
 XaL
XaL
qb
qb



 11
1
1
.                (86) 
Equation (86) implies 0
d
dl
 and       0.  qULQ
d
d

. Moreover (86) represents that when 
some people are withdrawn from the peasant economy, with an unchanged number of hours of work 
per person, the marginal physical return work will increase [2].  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this study we have analyzed some parts of Sen’s paper “Peasants and Dualism With or Without 
Surplus Labor” with detail mathematical calculations. We have tried to give the physical interpreta-
tions of the mathematical results clearly (as far as possible). We hope the readers will feel comport 
when they study this article. We have not discussed all the portions of the paper of Sen. So that 
readers can take the opportunity to discuss the parts which we have not tried. In their study they can 
set new examples to discuss the paper of Sen.  
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